All this means that actors, whether well-resourced organizations or grassroots collectives, have a clear path to deploying politically persuasive AI at scale. Early demonstrations have already occurred elsewhere in the world. In India’s 2024 general election, tens of millions of dollars were reportedly spent on AI to segment voters, identify swing voters, deliver personalized messaging through robocalls and chatbots, and more. In Taiwan, officials and researchers have documented China-linked operations using generative AI to produce more subtle disinformation, ranging from deepfakes to language model outputs that are biased toward messaging approved by the Chinese Communist Party.
It’s only a matter of time before this technology comes to US elections—if it hasn’t already. Foreign adversaries are well positioned to move first. China, Russia, Iran, and others already maintain networks of troll farms, bot accounts, and covert influence operators. Paired with open-source language models that generate fluent and localized political content, those operations can be supercharged. In fact, there is no longer a need for human operators who understand the language or the context. With light tuning, a model can impersonate a neighborhood organizer, a union rep, or a disaffected parent without a person ever setting foot in the country. Political campaigns themselves will likely be close behind. Every major operation already segments voters, tests messages, and optimizes delivery. AI lowers the cost of doing all that. Instead of poll-testing a slogan, a campaign can generate hundreds of arguments, deliver them one on one, and watch in real time which ones shift opinions.
The underlying fact is simple: Persuasion has become effective and cheap. Campaigns, PACs, foreign actors, advocacy groups, and opportunists are all playing on the same field—and there are very few rules.
The policy vacuum
Most policymakers have not caught up. Over the past several years, legislators in the US have focused on deepfakes but have ignored the wider persuasive threat.
Foreign governments have begun to take the problem more seriously. The European Union’s 2024 AI Act classifies election-related persuasion as a “high-risk” use case. Any system designed to influence voting behavior is now subject to strict requirements. Administrative tools, like AI systems used to plan campaign events or optimize logistics, are exempt. However, tools that aim to shape political beliefs or voting decisions are not.
By contrast, the United States has so far refused to draw any meaningful lines. There are no binding rules about what constitutes a political influence operation, no external standards to guide enforcement, and no shared infrastructure for tracking AI-generated persuasion across platforms. The federal and state governments have gestured toward regulation—the Federal Election Commission is applying old fraud provisions, the Federal Communications Commission has proposed narrow disclosure rules for broadcast ads, and a handful of states have passed deepfake laws—but these efforts are piecemeal and leave most digital campaigning untouched.
